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Abstract of the Dissertation
Understanding Task Interference in Prospective Memory Using On-Line Probes:
Strategic Delay or Limited-Capacity Monitoring?
by
Francis Anderson
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological & Brain Sciences
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Professor Mark A. McDaniel, Chairperson

In prospective memory (PM) research, a common finding is that people are generally slower to
respond to a given ongoing task (OT) when they have to perform a PM task concurrently, as
compared to performing the OT alone. Multiprocess theory claims that this slowing, termed task
interference, is indicative of monitoring processes. Monitoring is thought to be cognitively
demanding and heavily reliant on working memory, as people hold their intention in mind and
look for features relevant to the PM task. PM decision control (PMDC) theory, instead, proposes
that task interference reflects a strategic and intentional delay strategy. To address this theoretical
dispute, in the present study we first develop and validate a within-block probe procedure that
measures self-reported difficulty and motivation, in order to determine their relationship with
task interference. Monitoring could involve motivational factors—in that some people may not
care enough to monitor—but clearly implicates difficulty as a fundamental correlate of task
interference. By contrast, the PMDC model clearly excludes difficulty as having any association
with task interference, but one’s motivation to perform well on the PM task could potentially
explain differences in task interference. After validating the probe procedure in the first
x

experiment, we applied the methodology in two following experiments designed to manipulate
task interference, with the central question being, “Is task interference (i.e., change in behavior
due to PM) associated with an increase in self-reported difficulty, or is it better tracked by selfreported motivation to perform the PM task?” In both experiments, we found that difficulty
ratings – not motivation – was consistently related to task interference, supporting a multiprocess
view.

xi

Chapter 1: Introduction
Prospective memory (PM) is an individual’s ability to execute an intended action at a later time
or event. Characteristically, a PM task is embedded within ongoing activity, requiring someone
to stop whatever they happen to be doing at the appropriate moment and execute their intention.
For example, you might form the intention to make a phone call on the walk to work in the
morning, requiring you to appropriately remember the intention at the beginning of the walk,
rather than getting distracted by the usual morning bustle. This example highlights another
unique feature of PM—the large degree of self-initiation. Successful PM retrieval not only
requires retrospectively remembering the content of the intention, but also prospectively selfinitiating the intended action without any external prompt. Retrospective memory, by contrast, is
often externally requested (e.g., a friend asking how your day has been), but that is far more rare
with PM. Even people that religiously update their smart-phone calendars, thereby offloading the
prospective component onto external reminders, must remember to actually put the intention in
their phone to begin with, and must also remember to perform numerous other intentions most
people do not set reminders for (e.g., vacuum the floor, get groceries, tweak that statistical
analysis).
In the laboratory, PM is often studied by giving participants an intention, such as pressing
the keyboard in response to a particular cue, also called a target, which is embedded within the
context of an ongoing task (OT). In this scenario, for some of the OT trials the stimulus is
actually a PM target. For example, given an ongoing 2-back task, where participants decide
whether the word seen two trials previously was the same as the word currently on the screen,
and the PM intention to press the Q key whenever a string of letters appears containing the
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consecutive letters tor (e.g., senator), participants must recognize while performing the 2-back
task that the stimulus happens to also be a target (i.e., it contains tor). Successful detection is
measured by appropriately suspending the OT response (i.e., yes or no) in favor of making a PM
response (i.e., press the Q key). Some researchers will also let participants make the PM
response on the next couple of trials, which stresses retrieval of the intention over the exact
timing of the action in its measure of PM accuracy. Many other variables are also in the hands of
the researchers, such as the total number of PM and OT trials, where the PM trials occur during
the experiment, and of course the exact PM task instructions.
This paradigm (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990) has been used extensively in the PM
literature, not only because of its simplicity, but also its real-world applicability (Dismukes,
2012). Just as in the real world, ongoing activity is the primary task for the participant,
addressing demands and making judgments as needed. The PM task is embedded within the OT,
therefore requiring someone to recognize the significance of the PM cue, interrupt whatever they
happened to be doing at the time, and perform the intended action. For instance, given the
intention to get gas on the way home from work, one has to stop dodging dangerous drivers (the
OT) and remember to take the appropriate turn (the cue) toward the gas station, instead of going
straight home as usual.
A particularly influential application of the paradigm has attempted to isolate the
processes involved in PM retrieval by examining OT behavior both with and without possessing
an additional PM intention. During the control block, participants perform the OT alone, serving
as a standard of comparison for the PM block, where participants perform the exact same OT but
now also have a PM task. When comparing these two blocks (or between-subjects groups) a
common finding is that participants are slower to respond to the OT in the PM block than in the
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control block. This OT response time slowing, termed task interference or cost, therefore must in
some way be related to performing the PM intention, operating under the assumption that the
response time cost reflects additional PM-related processing (see Smith, 2003).

3

Chapter 2: Theoretical Accounts of Task
Interference
2.1 Monitoring
To account for PM-related task interference, Smith (2003) proposed the PAM (preparatory
attentional and memory) theory of PM retrieval, which contends that task interference signifies
the engagement of preparatory attentional processes to support cue detection. Smith describes
these preparatory processes (hereafter described as monitoring) as being characterized by “some
level of nonautomatic monitoring of the environment for the occurrence of prospective memory
target events” (Smith, 2003, p. 349) and, “may include rehearsal of the prospective memory
target events” (Smith & Bayen, 2004, p. 757). A critical assumption of PAM theory, however, is
that attentional resources must be engaged throughout the OT to ensure detection; if any PM
target is presented during a lapse in monitoring, then it follows that the stimulus will only be
evaluated according to the OT, and the target will be missed. Around the same time, Guynn
(2003) proposed a two-process theory of task interference, which states that people must
constantly remain in a “retrieval mode,” maintaining high activation of the PM task, and on each
trial they search for features relevant to performing the PM task. Though similar in many
respects to PAM theory, Guynn’s model explicitly attributes task interference to two distinct
behaviors: a sustained retrieval mode followed by target-checking. As is clear from both
theories, a key characteristic of monitoring is that it is a limited-capacity cognitive process,
meaning that monitoring draws on attentional resources, is demanding and challenging, and
reliant on working memory.
4

The multiprocess theory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; 2007) differs from PAM theory by
proposing an additional route to PM retrieval, other than monitoring. Research has shown that
participants can sometimes achieve high PM accuracy in the absence of task interference—which
is problematic for PAM theory because it implies participants were able to successfully retrieve
the intention without monitoring (Einstein, McDaniel, Thomas, Mayfield, Shank, Morrisette, &
Breneiser, 2005; Harrison & Einstein, 2010; Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton, & Lee, 2010b; Scullin,
McDaniel, & Einstein, 2010a). Based on these studies and others, McDaniel and Einstein
theorized that successful PM can also occur when a strong external cue triggers spontaneous
retrieval of the intention. Often phenomenologically described as the intention, “popping into
mind,” spontaneous retrieval is a bottom-up retrieval process, driven by the high associative
strength between the cue and the intended action. Spontaneous retrieval is therefore thought to be
reflexive, relatively automatic, and reliable, so long as a strong cue is fully processed in the focus
of attention. Critically, multiprocess theory contends that both spontaneous retrieval and
monitoring are legitimate routes to successful PM performance. When task interference is
present, participants are assumed to be monitoring; by contrast, when task interference is absent
(and PM detection is excellent) they are assumed to have spontaneously retrieved the intention.
A critical determinant of whether spontaneous retrieval can occur, or monitoring is
required, is the focality of the PM task (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007; Einstein et al., 2005).
Though focality can probably be thought of as being on a spectrum, tasks are typically
dichotomized as either focal or nonfocal, referring to the degree of processing overlap between
the OT and PM task. In cases of high overlap (focal), OT processing simultaneously serves to aid
PM cue detection, thereby making retrieval highly likely and task interference unnecessary; in
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cases of low overlap (nonfocal), by contrast, the OT does not aid PM detection, thus requiring
additional PM processing and producing task interference.
To give a concrete example, imagine being given a 2-back task (with word stimuli) as the
OT, and the PM task is to press the Q key upon seeing the word history. Because OT processing
overlaps highly with PM task processing—that is, accessing the semantic content of the word is
required for both the OT and PM task—the task is focal. In contrast, if the PM task is to press the
Q key if the word contains the consecutive letters tor, the PM task would be considered nonfocal.
This is because determining whether the word is the same one as the one presented 2 trials
previously does not require processing the individual letters, which the PM task does (see
Einstein & McDaniel, 2005, for additional explanation). To reiterate, when given a focal PM
task, participants do not have to monitor (though some people may choose to) and typically
obtain high PM and little-to-no task interference. Alternatively, when using a nonfocal task,
participants must employ additional resources to monitor for the cue, thereby reducing the
likelihood of detecting the cue (lower PM) and resulting in task interference.
Multiprocess theory has come to take a dominant stance in the field after the late 2000s
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2007), with numerous studies validating the existence of spontaneous
retrieval, and reaffirming the qualities and characteristics of monitoring (Abney, McBride, &
Petrella, 2013; Boywitt & Rummel, 2012; Brewer, Knight, Marsh, & Unsworth, 2010; Cohen,
2013; Cohen, Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008; Einstein et al., 2005; Harrison & Einstein, 2010;
Harrison, Mullet, Whiffen, Ousterhout, & Einstein, 2014; Rummel, Smeekens, & Kane, 2017;
Scullin et al., 2010b; Scullin et al., 2010a; Scullin, McDaniel, & Shelton, 2013). Yet, more
recently, PM decision control (PMDC) theory (Strickland, Loft, Remington, & Heathcote, 2018),
which has been developed considerably from previous instantiations (Heathcote, Loft, &
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Remington, 2015; Strickland, Heathcote, Remington, & Loft, 2017), provides an alternative
explanation for task interference: a strategic delay.

2.2 Decision Control
According to PMDC theory, participants are assumed to intentionally delay their OT responding,
as opposed to monitoring for PM targets, in order to allow additional time (i.e., task interference)
for participants to realize the stimulus is a target. The theoretical architecture Strickland et al.
(2018) proposed is that OT and PM information simultaneously accumulate toward their
respective thresholds for responding, but separately, and at different rates. PM information is
thought to accumulate more slowly than OT information, and participants must have some
awareness of this, because they increase their OT decision threshold, requiring more information
to make a response. The increase in OT conservatism comes at a cost to response times, but
makes it more likely that the slower PM information will hit its own threshold and lead to a
successful PM response. Hereafter referred to as a strategic or proactive delay, this is one of the
primary mechanisms of PMDC, and has its roots in a previous model that only included the
delay component (Heathcote et al., 2015). Specifically, based on the analysis of response time
and accuracy using accumulator models (e.g., linear ballistic accumulator model, Brown &
Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff diffusion model, Ratcliff, 1978), Heathcote et al. observed a consistent
and sizeable increase in only the decision threshold parameter when PM demands were added to
the OT, providing evidence favoring a delay strategy, and serving as the basis for PMDC theory.
To better situate the theory, these accumulator models decompose response times and
accuracy into a number of parameters, but three have been theoretically important in PM
research: decision threshold (a), drift-rate (v), and nondecision time (t0). As alluded to
previously, the decision threshold represents the amount of information required before a
7

decision is executed, and Heathcote et al. (2015) contended that increases in this parameter were
observed because participants delayed their responding to allow more time for PM information
to reach its own threshold. The drift-rate, by contrast, represents the speed at which the
information accrues; Heathcote et al. theorized that this parameter should have been the one to
increase if task interference reflected a limited-capacity monitoring process (discussed further
below). Finally, nondecision time represents the total amount of time on a trial devoted to all
processes other than decision-making (e.g., response execution and feature encoding).
Therefore, an increase in the threshold parameter indicates a more conservative
speed/accuracy policy, causing accuracy and response times to increase. Increases in the driftrate reflect both faster and more accurate responding, and can therefore be seen as indicative of
task difficulty, with lower drift-rates signifying more difficult tasks (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998).
Increases in nondecision time reflect slower responding without affecting the decision process;
but, some researchers have theorized that PM target-checking behavior before or after an OT
decision has been made could be funneled into this parameter (Anderson, Rummel, & McDaniel,
2018; Horn & Bayen, 2015).
To briefly summarize the accumulator modeling efforts thus far, the field has consistently
observed increases in the decision threshold parameter (Anderson et al., 2018; Ball &
Aschenbrenner, 2018; Boywitt & Rummel, 2012; Heathcote et al., 2015; Horn, Bayen, & Smith,
2011; 2013; Horn & Bayen, 2015; Rummel, Kuhlmann, & Touron, 2013; Strickland et al., 2017,
2018), but contrary to Heathcote et al., some studies have also observed decreases in the driftrate (Anderson et al., 2018; Boywitt & Rummel, 2012; Horn et al., 2011, 2013; Rummel et al.,
2013) and increases in nondecision time (Anderson et al., 2018; Horn & Bayen, 2015). PMrelated decreases in the drift-rate conflicts with PMDC because they suggest that alternative
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processes, which are associated with an increase in the difficulty of the task, contribute to task
interference. The same is true of nondecision time, if there is merit to the argument that cuemonitoring could occur before or after the OT decision process.
Returning to the PMDC model, the proactive delay mechanism is only one of several that
work in tandem to make PM detection more likely, and this is what separates PMDC from its
delay-only predecessor (Heathcote et al., 2015). PMDC theory is based on a model of both the
OT and PM task as two separate diffusion processes, instead of making assumptions about an
unmodeled PM accumulation process. Based on their findings, Strickland et al. (2018) also
proposed, 1) that people can strategically lower their PM threshold, requiring less information to
make a PM response, and 2) that participants have reactive control: on PM trials, as more
information accumulates suggesting a PM target is present, the OT accumulation process is
inhibited to avoid preempting the PM response. Further, PMDC theorists explicitly specify that
the proactive control components (OT and PM threshold changes) are “goal-driven”, caused by a
“strategic trade-off” between response times and accuracy, and are clearly conscious and
deliberate because “participants slow their ongoing task decision process to give a parallel PM
process more time to reach response selection” (Strickland et al., 2018, p. 855). Together, these
three mechanisms work to prioritize PM information over OT information, slowing down OT
responding both proactively and reactively, as well as proactively speeding up the PM decision
process via a lower PM threshold.
One final question to address is how PMDC theory handles focality: Under nonfocal
conditions, the PM accumulation rate is presumed to be slower than that of the OT, therefore
requiring a delay. Plainly, the discussion of PMDC thus far has been assuming a nonfocal PM
task. Regarding focal tasks, PMDC assumes that PM information accumulates as fast, or faster,
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than OT information (Loft & Remington, 2013; Heathcote et al., 2015). In this case, PM
information wins the race against OT information without needing any adjustment to the
decision threshold (i.e., no task interference), and participants therefore recognize the stimulus as
a PM target before reaching an OT decision.

10

Chapter 3: Leveraging Factors Associated
with Task Interference
Focality has repeatedly been shown to be one of the most powerful factors influencing task
interference, but there are numerous others to consider, many of which hold theoretical
relevance. First, however, it is important to note that even subtle demand characteristics could
impact whether or not participants choose to monitor (Anderson, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2017).
For example, if the title or description of the study explicitly mentions or prioritizes the PM task,
the researcher spends far more time explaining the PM instructions than the OT instructions, or
other features clue the participants as to the focus of the study, then participants may be more
inclined to monitor (or delay) than they otherwise would.
For researchers interested in minimizing task interference – to study spontaneous
retrieval, for instance – there are a number of other strategies that can be used. McDaniel,
Umanath, Einstein, and Waldum (2015) recommend using fewer PM targets, prioritizing or
emphasizing OT performance, delaying presentation of the first target until well into the
experiment, and of course using a focal PM task. These recommendations have been validated in
numerous individual studies, and a recent meta-analysis supports these general conclusions
(though, the degree of OT emphasis was not assessed) as well: Task interference is reduced with
a lower frequency of PM targets, when the first cue is presented later in the experiment, and
dramatically so when a focal cue is used instead of a nonfocal cue (Anderson, Strube, &
McDaniel, 2019).
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Though both PMDC and multiprocess theories have a ready account of task interference,
an important point of divergence between the two theories is what cognitive experiences are
actually associated with manipulations of task interference. Because the underlying theoretical
architectures differ so dramatically, it should be possible to look at factors that cause variation in
task interference and ask which theory best accounts for the findings, given their fundamental
assumptions. For example, a critical assumption of multiprocess theory is that focal tasks are
associated with lower task interference and higher PM performance because they have reduced
attentional demands, relative to nonfocal tasks, obviating the need for monitoring. With no need
to harness attentional resources for the purpose of monitoring, an obvious conclusion would be
that the focal task is “easier” than the nonfocal task. Put the other way, nonfocal PM tasks should
simultaneously be associated with increases in task interference and with increases in perceived
difficulty, relative to focal tasks. This is not limited to manipulations of focality, either;
perceived difficulty should increase and decrease along with task interference for any factor.
For PMDC, by contrast, there should be no association between task interference and
difficulty ratings because thresholds track an internal policy about how much information you
need to reach a decision. Drift-rates, instead, are thought to assess the relative difficulty of a task
(Ratcliff & Rouder, 1988), and PMDC clearly states that drift-rates are not affected by PM
demands: “nine PM cost datasets…revealed that PM cost is largely attributable to increases in
response threshold, and is not attributable to changes in ongoing task evidence accumulation”
(Strickland et al., 2018, p. 854). Therefore, any other candidate dependent measure capturing
changes in task interference should be voluntary and premeditated, with time being the only real
cost. This is because participants set their decision threshold before a trial’s stimulus appears,
and seemingly without feedback, because the threshold parameter is thought to stabilize within
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the first few trials of an experiment (Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016). Thus, the
cognitive experiences associated with changes in task interference should be both preemptive
and intentional, rather than arising because of an inability to control attention. We lack any
propositions from PMDC regarding why people may follow different delay policies, or what
would cause someone to change their delay policy; therefore, we offer that perhaps the people
who are most motivated to perform well on the PM task should display the greatest increases in
task interference. It seems plausible that participants who feel the most motivated would be
willing to sacrifice the time necessary to ensure detection of the PM targets, whereas the least
motivated may simply be eager to finish the experiment quickly, without much concern over
missing targets.
To our knowledge there is no published work that has simply asked participants about
their perceived difficulty in order to observe whether or not it increases due to possessing a PM
intention, but there are several tangential findings that point toward PM-related processes being
resource-demanding and costly. First, and perhaps most straightforwardly, successful (nonfocal)
PM has been linked to individual differences in working memory. For example, both Smith
(2003) and Brewer et al. (2010) showed that those higher in working memory capacity had better
PM, and that task interference was associated with PM performance for those with worse
working memory. Working memory has been consistently linked to attentionally demanding
activities and has been described as being critical for “controlled processing in attentiondemanding circumstances” and inhibition of more dominant, automatic processes (Barrett,
Tugade, & Engle, 2004, p. 554). Further, given the theoretical import of accumulator model
parameters for the current study, research has linked higher working memory to lower drift-rates
(i.e., faster information accumulation leading to better task performance) (Schmiedek, Oberauer,
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Wilhelm, Süß, & Wittmann, 2007). Thus, the relationship between working memory demands
and difficulty appears firm.
Second, we have already noted that several studies have found PM-related reductions in
OT drift-rates (Anderson et al., 2018; Boywitt & Rummel, 2012; Horn et al., 2011, 2013;
Rummel et al., 2013), offering some evidence that the OT is more difficult when a nonfocal PM
intention is also active. Third, the bulk of the literature shows that older adults have worse PM,
particularly for nonfocal tasks (Kliegel, Jäger, & Phillips, 2008; Uttl, 2008; 2011), with the
theoretical rationale being that older adults have fewer cognitive resources (e.g., working
memory capacity) to harness when monitoring for the PM cue (Park, Lautenschlager, Hedden,
Davidson, Smith, & Smith, 2002). Finally, nonfocal PM has been consistently associated with
sustained activation in fronto-parietal regions such as the anterior prefrontal cortex (Cona,
Bisiacchi, Sartori, & Scarpazza, 2016; McDaniel, LaMontagne, Beck, Scullin, & Braver, 2013),
which have also been linked to working memory processes. Activation in these regions has been
described as costly and difficult to maintain for long periods of time, aligning well with the view
that these processes are difficult (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). Thus, in opposition to PMDC
theory, there is a strong theoretical basis to expect that task interference should be positively
related to difficulty.
Self-reported motivation is less diagnostic than difficulty, because according to
multiprocess theory participants may very well be motivated to perform well on the PM task, but
this would likely be reflected in their willingness to monitor. Therefore, if they are in fact
monitoring, then difficulty ratings should also increase, which would be problematic for PMDC.
If, however, motivation ratings were uniquely related to task interference, with no concurrent
increase in difficulty, then PMDC would gain strong support. Motivation has been studied in the
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PM literature primarily by emphasizing the importance of one task (ongoing or PM), and
secondarily by providing some sort of incentive (e.g., money) for good PM performance (see
Walter & Meier, 2014, for a review). There has been some variability, but findings generally
indicate greater costs when the PM task is emphasized, and that these costs result in better PM
(Ball & Brewer, 2018; Ball & Aschenbrenner, 2017; Einstein et al., 2005; Harrison & Einstein,
2010; Horn & Bayen, 2015; Loft & Humphreys, 2012; Loft & Yeo, 2007; Smith & Bayen,
2004). This appears to be particularly true for nonfocal tasks, with focal tasks sometimes
showing no effects of task emphasis (Harrison & Einstein, 2010; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, &
Einstein, 2004). Motivating participants by rewarding successful PM, too, tends to improve
performance (Jeong & Cranney, 2009; Krishnan & Shapiro, 1999; Cook, Rummel, & Dummel,
2015), but there is very little research examining the effects of rewards on task interference. That
being said, one study – Cook et al. – found no increase in task interference to accompany the PM
benefit. On the whole, in support of a PMDC view, there is good evidence that both PM accuracy
and task interference are positively related to motivation.
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Chapter 4: Aim of the Present Study
To address this theoretical dispute, in the present study we first develop and validate a withinblock probe procedure that measures self-reported difficulty and motivation, in order to
determine their relationship with task interference. The PMDC model clearly excludes difficulty
as having any association with task interference, but one’s motivation to perform well on the PM
task might. By contrast, monitoring could involve motivational factors—in that some people may
not care enough to monitor—but clearly implicates difficulty as the fundamental correlate of task
interference. As developed further below, we probed participants throughout the first experiment
about the difficulty of the task (both ongoing and PM), as well as their motivation to perform
well on the task. Following successful validation of the probe procedure, we applied the
methodology in two experiments designed to manipulate task interference, with the central
question being, “Is task interference (i.e., change in behavior due to PM) associated with an
increase in self-reported difficulty, or is it better tracked by self-reported motivation to perform
the PM task?”
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Chapter 5: Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to validate the probe methodology as being an accurate
assessment of difficulty and motivation, hopefully without affecting behaviors typically
associated with performing the OT or the PM task. Critically, we must also assess whether the
probes are tapping into both the OT and PM task—it is a distinct possibility that participants
could base their judgments solely on the OT. Toward that end, we manipulated the difficulty of
both the OT and the PM task separately, as well as motivation toward the PM task. To increase
difficulty of the OT, we had participants engage in blocks of both 1-back and 2-back trials, with
2-back trials being more difficult (for a review supporting this claim, see Jaeggi, Buschkuehl,
Perrig, & Meier, 2010). Thus, we should see increased ratings of difficulty in 2-back blocks
relative to 1-back blocks. To increase the difficulty of the PM task, some participants were given
one cue for their nonfocal task (the consecutive letters tor), whereas others were given three cues
for their nonfocal task (the consecutive letters tor, can, or mis)—with three cues being more
difficult (Anderson et al., 2019). Therefore, we should see higher difficulty ratings in the threecue condition than the one-cue condition. Finally, we manipulated motivation toward the PM
task by providing a financial incentive dependent on PM task performance in some blocks but
not in others. In the motivated blocks we should see greater ratings of motivation than in the nonmotivated blocks, given that various motivators, including money, typically improve PM,
thereby implying increased recruitment of PM detection processes (Walter & Meier, 2014).
As mentioned previously, it is also important to determine whether the presence of the
probes themselves change participants’ typical OT or PM task behavior. To assess this, we
included a no-probe control group to be compared to probed participants in terms of both OT and
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PM performance. Although it is possible the probes will serve as reminders to participants, based
on research from Reese and Cherry (2002) that showed no differences in PM accuracy between
probed and non-probed groups, we expect no differences in our own study as well.
As an aside, because the probe methodology we develop uses self-report, experimenters
should rightfully be wary about their use in novel laboratory paradigms. In PM research, on-line
probes have been used with some success to tackle a number of questions not answerable with
more objective behavioral measures. As just alluded to, Reese and Cherry (2002) used an openended thought probe procedure to assess whether or not on-task and off-task thoughts were
associated with PM performance. Although they found no significant relationship between
thoughts about the PM task and performance, they did find that PM performance did not differ
between probe and no-probe groups. Using a similar methodology, Rummel et al. (2017) showed
that participants reported fewer off-task thoughts when they possessed a PM intention as
compared to when they did not (implying a more on-task focus), as well as some suggestive
findings that PM-related thoughts were associated with better PM performance. They also found
that on-task thoughts had no relationship with OT response times, implying that this on-task
focus did not manifest itself in terms of increased monitoring behavior. Finally, Anderson and
Einstein (2016) successfully used thought probe methodology to illustrate that persisting
activation, slowed responding to previously relevant PM targets (i.e., a previously completed PM
task), also manifested itself in the form of conscious thoughts about the now-irrelevant PM task.
There is therefore some precedent for the use of on-line probes in laboratory PM experiments.
Briefly, we piloted our two less-studied manipulations (motivation and cue-number)
before Experiment 1, with 28 participants in the motivation pilot and 27 participants in the cuenumber pilot. In both pilots we manipulated the variables within-subjects (counterbalanced). For
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example, in one block we motivated participants with a financial incentive, and in the other we
did not. In the other pilot study, participants had a one-cue PM task (tor) for one block and a
three-cue PM task (tor, can, or mis) for the other block. In both cases the probe ratings responded
sensibly to the manipulation: Participants gave significantly higher motivation ratings in
motivated (M = 8.93, SE = .22) relative to non-motivated blocks (M = 7.13, SE = .43), and
participants gave significantly higher difficulty ratings in three-cue (M = 6.06, SE = .35) relative
to one-cue blocks (M = 4.95, SE = .42). Therefore, we had some confidence in our manipulations
before collecting data for Experiment 1.

5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants and Design
We used a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial design including the within-subjects variables OT load (1back, 2-back) and motivation (motivated, non-motivated), as well as the between-subjects
variable cue number (one, three). We also included a dangling control group that received no
probes, thereby assessing the potential impact of the probes on OT and PM task performance.
This no-probe control group had a reduced number of participants in each cell of the mixed
factorial design described above, for a total of 35 participants (one-cue, N = 20; three-cue, N =
15)1. By contrast, we collected data from 87 probed participants (one-cue, N = 43; three-cue, N =
44). Sample sizes were based on a power analysis targeting .80 power for a medium-sized,
between-subjects main effect (i.e., of cue number) for the factorial design described above,
assuming a within-subject correlation of .50. We obtained .83 power to detect the effect with our
final sample size.
1

Our design was not well-balanced for the no-probe participants because, by chance, we had to eliminate 5
participants in the three-cue condition due computer malfunction or inability to follow instructions.
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Participants were Washington University in St. Louis undergraduates who received
course credit for compensation, in addition to the monetary compensation earned depending on
number of PM targets detected (described in the Procedure). No exclusion criteria were used—
any student could participate.

5.1.2 Procedure
Participants were tested in individual rooms and sessions lasted approximately 30 min. They first
received instructions for performing the OT, called an n-back task, for four blocks of trials. They
were told that for two of these blocks they were to determine as quickly as possible whether the
presented word was the same as the trial presented immediately prior (1-back). For the other two
blocks, they were told to decide whether or not the presented word matched the word presented 2
trials prior (2-back). For match trials, they pressed the “1” key on the number pad; for non-match
trials they pressed the “2” key.2 They then performed 25 practice trials for either the 1-back or 2back task with response time and accuracy feedback. Of note, when the n-back task switched,
participants were again given 25 practice trials with the new task.
Following the OT practice, participants were given instructions for the first block,
depending on their counterbalancing condition (i.e., motivated 1-back, motivated 2-back, nonmotivated 1-back, non-motivated 2-back). During each block, participants were instructed that
they were to perform the n-back task for this block of trials, but that we had an additional interest
in their ability to perform an intention in the future. Specifically, if at any point during the block
they saw the consecutive letters tor (or in the three-cue condition, tor, can, or mis) they were to

2

In some rare cases, participants reversed the response keys (i.e., responded 2 for match trials and 1 for non-match
trials). This was apparent when participants were nearly perfectly wrong (OT accuracy approaching 0). Because
chance accuracy is .50, they clearly mixed up the response keys. For cases obtaining .20 accuracy or worse, in all
three experiments, we reverse-scored OT accuracy. There were only two participants across all 3 experiments (both
in Experiment 1) who had accuracy near .50, and these people were eliminated from all analyses.
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press the Q key instead of making their OT decision. They were also told that if the OT response
accidentally preempted their PM task response that they could still press the Q key a trial or two
later. Each of the four blocks had 3 unique PM targets, regardless of cue number condition.
Participants were asked to repeat the OT and PM instructions to the experimenter, as an
understanding-check, before continuing with each block.
Motivation toward the PM task was manipulated with a PM performance-dependent
financial incentive. For the motivated blocks, participants were told that they could earn up to $5
compensation, in addition to the course credit they were entitled to for participation, and that the
exact amount of money earned would be proportional to the number of PM targets they detected
(but they were not told how many targets would appear). If participants transitioned from a
motivated block to a non-motivated block, they were required to tell the experimenter that the
financial motivation was over, to ensure understanding. However, if participants started with a
non-motivated block, then no mention of any financial incentive was made at that time.
Therefore, the exact counterbalancing procedures used in this experiment was critical.
Motivation was always grouped consecutively, to avoid confusion, with participants either
executing 2 motivated blocks followed by 2 non-motivated blocks, or vice versa. Similarly, 1back and 2-back task order was alternated between blocks, starting with a 1-back or 2-back task.
For example, half of the participants performed the 1-back followed by the 2-back task for their
motivated blocks, and again performed the 1-back followed by the 2-back task for their nonmotivated blocks. As follows, there were only 4 counterbalancing possibilities.
Next, participants were given instructions for completing the probes (with the exception
of the no-probe control group). They were told that they would be interrupted occasionally
during each block of trials and asked a couple questions. First, they were shown the difficulty
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probe, “On a scale of 1-10, how difficult was it to perform both the [1, 2]-back task and the Qkey task together, immediately prior to this prompt? 10 means you were genuinely struggling to
perform the tasks, and 1 means it was no challenge at all to perform the tasks.” They were then
shown the motivation probe, “On a scale of 1-10, how motivated were you to perform well on
both the [1, 2]-back task and the Q-key task together, immediately prior to this prompt? 10
means you wanted to achieve your best performance on the tasks, and 1 means you did not care
about achieving good performance on the tasks.”3 Participants were asked to repeat these
instructions to the experimenter, as an understanding-check, before continuing. Probe order was
maintained to minimize participant confusion, and difficulty was chosen to be the first probe
because it is the most theoretically diagnostic.4
Participants then proceeded with the first block, which contained 107 trials: 100 OT trials
(half match, half non-match), 3 PM trials (always a non-match trial), and 4 probe trials. The PM
targets occurred in fixed positions on trials 40, 70, and 105. The probes were also fixed, but on
trials 25, 50, 75, and 100, to maximize the temporal distance between the probes. Immediately
following, participants were given OT and PM instructions for the next block, according to
counterbalancing condition. Task characteristics were nearly the same in the other blocks, but
PM targets varied slightly (e.g., on trial 104 instead of 105) to accommodate the n-back task
randomization.

5.1.3 Materials
Stimuli for the n-back task (all words) were selected using the Balota et al. (2007) norms. Items
generated were between 4-8 characters in length and had an average Log_Freq_HAL of 8.00. In
3

A 10-point scale was used because increased Likert scale ranges have been shown to better approach normality
than those with reduced ranges, without affecting the general structure of the means and variances (Leung, 2011).
4
We wanted to allow participants to get into a rhythm of performing the tasks and answering the probes, in an effort
to minimize potential error caused by participants’ mixing up the probe questions.
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each block, there were 100 OT trials—20 of these were unique words that occurred only once, 20
words appeared on match trials and thus occurred twice, and 20 words appeared on non-match
trials but also occurred twice. Each block contained a different set of stimuli.

5.2 Results
5.2.1 OT and PM Performance
We analyzed each dependent variable (OT response times and accuracy, and PM accuracy),
using a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess the impacts of cue number (one,
three), OT load (1-back, 2-back), and motivation (low, high). For OT response times and
accuracy, we eliminated probe trials, PM trials, and the 3 trials following a PM target from
analysis. We trimmed response times below 200 ms or greater than 3 SD above the mean (within
blocks, between participants). All descriptive statistics are reported in the original metric, but
analyses of response times were transformed as closely as possible to normality using the BoxCox power transformation (for this experiment, response times were raised to the power = .39).5
Additionally, we eliminated 2 participants who were at near-chance OT accuracy from all
analyses. Though OT and PM performance were not the primary dependent variables of interest,
we report full analyses to check whether participants behaved in a manner expected by previous
PM research.

5

Despite being uncommon in the field, we transformed response times in Experiment 1 to be analytically consistent
across experiments; for the models in Experiments 2 and 3, normality is a critical assumption, so we decided to
transform. However, none of the statistical inferences changed for this experiment when analyzed using the raw
scores.
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The 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA analyzing response times found a significant main effect of
motivation, F(1,120) = 74.87, p < .001, MSE = 1.58, ηp2 = .38, indicating that monetarily
motivated blocks were slower than the non-motivated blocks (see Table 1 for descriptive
statistics). There was also a main effect of OT load, F(1,120) = 37.90, p < .001, MSE = 4.02, ηp2
= .24, such that 2-back blocks were slower than 1-back blocks. The final main effect of cue
number was also significant, F(1,120) = 13.19, p < .001, MSE = 10.77, ηp2 = .10, with
participants in the three-cue condition responding more slowly than those in the one-cue
condition. There were no significant interactions, all p’s > .13. Counterbalancing order was
included in a separate model and had a number of significant interactions, which are described in
the Appendix, but inclusion of this factor did not change any of the aforementioned inferential
conclusions.
24

OT accuracy had large ceiling effects (M = .96, SD = .07), preventing any meaningful
inferential analyses. Regarding PM accuracy, the only significant effect was the main effect of
motivation, F(1,120) = 38.29, p < .001, MSE = .096, ηp2 = .24, indicating that participants
detected more targets when they were motivated as compared to when they were not. The effect
of cue number was marginally significant, F(1,120) = 3.44, p = .07, MSE = .252, ηp2 = .03, in the
expected direction: participants detected marginally more cues in the one-cue condition than the
three-cue condition. A marginal effect was also found for OT load, with numerically greater PM
accuracy in the 1-back blocks relative to the 2-back blocks, F(1,120) = 2.83, p = .10, MSE =
.135, ηp2 = .02. No other effects were significant.

5.2.2 Probe Responses
Of critical interest to this experiment is the validity of the probe responses; therefore, a series of
targeted t-tests were used. A paired-samples t-test comparing motivated to non-motivated blocks
was significant, t(86) = 7.15, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .77, with higher reported motivation in
motivated blocks (M = 7.58, SE = .21) than non-motivated blocks (M = 6.36, SE = .23). A second
paired-samples t-test comparing difficulty ratings for 1-back blocks to 2-back blocks was
significant, t(86) = 10.57, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.13, indicating that reported difficulty was
greater for the 2-back task (M = 6.04, SE = .19) than the 1-back task (M = 4.70, SE = .21).
Finally, an independent-samples t-test comparing difficulty ratings between the one-cue and
three-cue conditions was significant, t(85) = 2.38, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .51, with greater
difficulty ratings in the three-cue condition (M = 5.80, SE = .27) than the one-cue condition (M =
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4.92, SE = .25). Therefore, the probe methodology was validated as assessing what it was
designed to assess.6,7
Finally, of additional interest was whether the simple act of answering the probes would
affect OT or PM task performance. Therefore, an additional 2 independent-samples Wald t-tests
compared response times and PM accuracy (OT accuracy omitted due to high ceiling effects) —
targeting the difference between the 35 no-probe control participants and 87 probed participants.
There was no difference between the two groups in response times, t(71) = 1.58, p = .12,
Cohen’s d = .31. However, probed participants (M = .48, SE = .03) were significantly more
likely than non-probed participants (M = .34, SE = .04) to detect the PM targets, t(72.87) = 3.01,
p = .003, Cohen’s d = .34. Likely, the probes served to remind participants about the PM task.

5.3 Discussion
The goal of Experiment 1 was to validate the probe methodology as properly assessing
participant’s experienced difficulty and motivation toward both the OT and PM task. Examining
OT and PM performance, first, we observed significantly slower response times in motivated
blocks relative to non-motivated, diverging from prior research (Cook et al., 2015). We
observed, as expected by prior work, faster response times for the 1-back blocks than the 2-back
blocks (West & Bowry, 2005), and faster response times in the one-cue condition than the threecue condition (Cohen et al., 2008). Regarding PM accuracy, motivated blocks performed
significantly better than non-motivated blocks, converging with Cook et al., and adding

6

The findings were identical using a more comprehensive ANOVA model, with no interactions by condition. The
only finding of additional interest was that participants were significantly (p = .05) more motivated when
performing the 1-back than the 2-back task.
7
An interesting point to note is that there was very little variability in difficulty or motivation within-blocks. That is,
there did not appear to be any time-course effects such as steady changes (e.g., difficulty increase) or large jumps in
the probe dependent variables. Instead, variability in probe responses can largely be attributed to either condition or
participant differences.
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confidence as to the efficacy of our manipulation. The effect of cue-number, however, was only
marginally significant, rather than showing a significant increase in PM performance for the onecue relative to the three-cue condition (see Anderson et al., 2019). The effect of OT load also did
not quite reach significance, but this is unsurprising given that previous findings have been
inconsistent, with some studies showing that OT load impairs PM performance (West,
Krompinger, & Bowry, 2005) and others obtaining no difference (West & Bowry, 2005).
Collectively, these findings align reasonably well with predictions from either of the two
theoretical frameworks, PMDC or multiprocess, and conform with the bulk of the literature.
Although PMDC theory would not necessarily predict increased response times with three PM
cues relative to one—given that both OT and PM information extraction is assumed to operate in
parallel, and there is no clear reason why more cues should slow down the PM accumulation
rate—increasing the perceived demands of the PM task could encourage participants to allocate a
more conservative OT decision threshold. All other results, however, would be straightforwardly
predicted by either theory.
Next, confident that participants were behaving in a manner expected by prior research,
we move to the primary variables of interest: difficulty and motivation ratings. The probes were
validated as measuring what they were intended to measure, with difficulty ratings increasing
both when PM and when OT difficulty was increased (i.e., three PM cues compared to one, and
2-back compared to 1-back task, respectively). Additionally, motivation ratings increased when
participants were financially incentivized to detect PM targets. We were also interested in
determining whether or not the probes themselves affected behavior: the only observed
difference was that probed participants had better PM accuracy.
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Therefore, an important qualification to be mindful of is that the probe procedure likely
reminds participants of the PM task, thereby increasing target detection. Although the
effectiveness of reminders in improving PM performance has been somewhat mixed (Guynn,
McDaniel, & Einstein, 1998), there is a substantial probability that reminders do improve PM
(Henry, Rendell, Phillips, Dunlop, & Kliegel, 2012), and this increased PM accuracy in the
probed group. Yet, we do not believe this fundamentally alters the PM processes of interest, for
two reasons. First, if reminders increased PM, presumably this would be caused by stimulating
participants’ monitoring or delay behavior, thereby making target detection more likely. Because
that is already the behavior we are interested in, the primary worry, then, would be bringing
participants’ PM up to ceiling or reducing the likelihood that some participants would completely
forget about the PM task. Second, we argue that idiosyncratic reminders are likely present in
many PM experiments. Often, stimuli are presented with meaning, especially in the commonly
used lexical decision task, which involves deciding whether a string of letters forms a real word.
In these cases, partial-cuing has been shown to increase PM performance (e.g., seeing lion before
the actual cue, tiger; Taylor, Marsh, Hicks, & Hancock, 2004) and such cues are likely to be
idiosyncratically present in many PM experiments (e.g., upon seeing the stimulus sister,
someone might be reminded of the PM cue dancer, if they have a sister who dances). Because
the probes are systematically present for everyone, however, participants in the following studies
are likely to be reminded of the PM task more, on average, than is typical in PM research. With
these qualifications in mind, we proceed to Experiment 2.
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Chapter 6: Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, our primary aim was to use the probe methodology to examine the relationship
between difficulty, motivation, and task interference. One way to gain leverage on the theoretical
debate is to induce changes in task interference over time, and look to see if difficulty or
motivation ratings follow a similar pattern. Both PMDC and multiprocess theories assume that
participants make an initial judgment about how best to perform the OT and PM task together,
and begin the experiment engaging in whatever processes cause task interference (delay or
monitoring), if any are needed. Yet, their explanations for why task interference may, in this
case, decline over time differs considerably: According to multiprocess, participants may cease
monitoring because the heavy reliance on attentional resources makes it prohibitive over long
periods of time. From a PMDC perspective, because task interference is due to a preemptive and
strategic decision that does not tax attentional resources, motivational factors are likely at play:
Perhaps participants wish to get out of the experiment quicker and decide they are willing to miss
PM targets should they appear.
We mentioned earlier that manipulating the placement of the first PM target is one way to
affect task interference, such that participants are more inclined to monitor/delay if the first
target is presented early in the experiment. The speed of encountering the first PM target is
referred to as the PM onset delay, and the finding that decreases in task interference are
associated with increases in the PM onset delay implies that participants’ monitoring or delay
behavior is affected by their expectancy of target events and/or attentional lapses. Several
experiments have manipulated the onset delay, either by waiting a certain amount of time or a
certain number of trials to present the first PM target. Conte and McBride (2018), for instance,
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waited between one and six minutes to present the first PM cue, and found that longer delays
lead to less task interference directly before the eventual presentation of the cue, and worse PM
performance. In a similar study, McBride et al. (2011) manipulated the onset delay (40, 100, 200,
300, or 400 trials before presentation) and focality. The focal condition was not affected by onset
delay; however, at short delays nonfocal PM performance was as good as focal, but then
immediately plummeted for all longer delays. Further, task interference was high in the nonfocal
condition at the shortest delay, but tapered off for the longer delays, and wasn’t present for the
focal task except at the shortest delay. Finally, it has also been shown that task interference
declines across the experiment more quickly when expected cues are not presented than when
they are (Loft, Kearney, & Remington, 2008). Collectively, these findings all point toward the
crucial role initial target presentation has in reinforcing monitoring/delay behavior, particularly
for nonfocal tasks. If many trials (e.g, 100 or more trials, see McBride et al., 2011) are passed
between PM target presentations, then participants either have difficulty maintaining
(multiprocess), or choose to reduce (PMDC), high levels of task interference.
In this experiment, we manipulated the onset delay by presenting the first and only PM
target either early or late in the experiment. In the PM-far condition, the PM target was presented
near the end of the experiment, whereas in a PM-near condition the target was presented early.
We expect task interference to begin at an elevated level, and to generally decline in both
conditions, but especially so in the PM-far condition. The reasoning, according to multiprocess
theory, is that because monitoring is attentionally demanding, and participants in the PM-far
conditions are never reinforced for this behavior, the intention is likely to involuntarily slip from
mind as the experiment progresses. Thus, because both conditions go for long periods of time
without seeing a PM target, they should both decline, but we expect this reduction in task
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interference to occur more quickly in the PM-far conditions. Finally, we manipulated PM
focality between-subjects, and, following multiprocess theory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007), we
expect effects of task interference to be especially pronounced in the nonfocal conditions. In the
focal conditions these effects should be smaller, if present (Einstein et al., 2005).
Of special interest is whether difficulty or motivation ratings will follow a similar pattern
to task interference. From the multiprocess perspective, we expect the nonfocal conditions to
show an immediate increase in difficulty ratings for the PM block relative to the control block
(reduced for focal conditions). Further, because monitoring is difficult, and this behavior is not
reinforced in the PM-far conditions, task interference should decline and thus difficulty ratings
should as well. In the PM-near conditions, this decline should be less steep because detecting a
PM target event should theoretically serve to validate the increased effort. Regarding motivation,
predictions are less clear; however, there is a distinct possibility that motivation (i.e., motivation
to monitor) could decline when PM targets are not encountered. Yet, it is equally plausible that
participants are just as motivated to perform well on the task but cannot maintain monitoring
behavior over the course of the entire block. Alternatively, therefore, motivation ratings may not
track task interference.
Under PMDC, because setting decision thresholds is a strategic decision not dependent
on limited-capacity resources, there is no reason why difficulty ratings should change due to
these experimental manipulations. Thus, despite obtaining task interference, there should be no
increase in difficulty ratings – in any condition – from the control block to the PM block. Rated
difficulty could change over the time-course of the block, but these changes should be identical
in the control block and the PM block. Instead, greater task interference should be associated
with higher ratings of motivation. The logic is as follows: Under PMDC, participants are
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presumably aware that nonfocal PM information accumulates slower than the OT information,
and if they want to ensure detection of the PM targets then they must raise their decision
threshold. Because threshold setting has nothing to do with difficulty, the only reason
participants should do this is because they are motivated to perform well. Thus, motivation
ratings in the nonfocal conditions should increase in the PM block relative to the control block.
Further, if task interference declines in the PM-far conditions as expected, then this should be
reflected by decreased motivation, implying that participants decided to respond more liberally,
resulting in a lower decision threshold.
As a final note, to aid interpretation of these numerous interactive effects, we denote
changes between blocks (PM block – control block) as PM-related changes, similar to the way
task interference is used to denote a change in response times. Thus, for example, greater PMrelated difficulty would mean a larger difference in difficulty ratings between the PM and control
blocks, and the same applies for PM-related motivation.

6.1 Method
6.1.1 Participants and Design
The design of this experiment was a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial including the within-subjects
variable block (control, PM) and the between-subjects variables focality (focal, nonfocal), and
onset delay (PM-near, PM-far). All effects of critical interest involve the interaction with block,
therefore, the power analysis targeted a within/between interaction for this factorial design.
Obtaining .80 power for a medium-sized, within/between interaction required 10 participants in
each of the 4 groups. To increase our likelihood of detecting significant associations (e.g.,
between dependent measures, such as response times and difficulty ratings), we instead assigned
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32 participants to both of the focal groups and 31 participants to both of the nonfocal groups
(total N = 126), which resulted in .99 power for the within/between interaction. Participants were
Washington University in St. Louis undergraduates who received course credit for
compensation. As in Experiment 1, no exclusion criteria were used.

6.1.2 Procedure
Participants were tested in individual rooms with sessions lasting approximately 30 min. They
first received instructions for performing the OT, a 2-back task, with identical instructions to
Experiment 1, and identical practice procedures.
Next, participants were given instructions for completing the first block, depending on
counterbalance condition (control, PM), as well as instructions for responding to the probes. As
in the first experiment, participants were required to repeat these instructions to the experimenter
as an understanding-check. For the control block, participants then completed 204 total trials,
with 4 probes embedded on trials 50, 100, 150, and 200. Probes in the control block were
different only in that they did not reference the Q key task (because they did not possess an
intention). For the PM block, PM characteristics changed depending on focality: Half of the
participants in the focal conditions received the target writer, whereas the other half received the
target dancer. Half of the participants in the nonfocal conditions received words containing tor
as their PM target, whereas the other half received words containing ten. All PM instructions
were identical in form to Experiment 1. The PM block contained 205 total trials. Probes again
occurred on trials 50, 100, 150, and 200; in terms of PM targets, either a focal target (writer,
dancer) or a nonfocal target (tor word, ten word) occurred on trial 25 in the PM-near conditions
and on trial 198 in the PM-far conditions.
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6.1.3 Materials
As in Experiment 1, stimuli for the n-back task (all words) were selected using the Balota et al.
(2007) norms. Items generated were between 4-8 characters in length and had an average
Log_Freq_HAL of 8.00. In each block, there were 200 OT trials—40 of these were unique words
that occurred only once, 40 words appeared on match trials and thus occurred twice, and 40
words appeared on non-match trials but also occurred twice. Each block contained a different set
of stimuli.

6.2 Results
6.2.1 Analysis Strategy
We used hierarchical linear modeling to analyze clusters of trials (level 1) nested within blocks
(level 2) nested within participants (level 3), letting intercepts vary. Predicting OT response
times, for example, we computed means within clusters of trials split in time by the probe trials.
As in Experiment 1, we eliminated probe trials, PM trials, and the 3 trials following a PM target
from in our OT response time and accuracy analyses. We also used the same trimming
procedures and optimally transformed the data using the Box-Cox power transformation
(response times raised to the power = .43).8 Unfortunately, OT accuracy was again on ceiling in
both blocks (control, M = .97, SD = .03; PM, M = .96, SD = .03), preventing meaningful
inferential analysis. Regarding PM performance, because there was only 1 PM target, we used
logistic regression to examine group differences in the factorial design.

8

As in Experiment 1, using raw response times in the following model, instead of transformed, did not affect any
inferential conclusions.
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In the hierarchical model, we predicted each continuous dependent variable by block
(control, PM), focality (focal, nonfocal), and onset delay (PM-near, PM-far), all dummy coded
(0, 1) respectively. Further, we included another factor, quarter, by splitting each block into
clusters of trials reflecting 4 time points (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4). Finally, we included counterbalance
condition as an individual factor. To arrive at the best possible model, we compared three nested
models for each dependent variable – main effects and all two-way interactions, all three-way
interactions, and the four-way interaction – using a likelihood ratio test.9 The best model for all
three dependent measures included only two-way interactions between the four factors.
We first report these univariate analyses, and then assess the simultaneous contributions
of the four dependent variables in separating the groups using MANOVA (multivariate
ANOVA). The use of MANOVA is particularly informative in this study because we are
interested in the relations among dependent variables (i.e., task interference, PM-related
difficulty and motivation ratings, and PM accuracy), and their differential patterning among the
conditions. The optimal combination of the dependent variables allows us to examine their
relative weights to assess how well each variable captures group variance, while simultaneously
accounting for their covariance structure: it could be the case that difficulty and motivation
ratings explain the same group variance, for instance. Descriptive statistics and the correlations
among variables can be found in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, and the full results from each
model can be found in Tables 4 (response times), 5 (difficulty), and 6 (motivation), but we focus
our report on theoretically informative findings (i.e., involving an interaction with block).

9

We began with a model including two-way interactions, rather than main effects only, because interactions with
the variable block are critically informative to assess any PM-related effects.
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6.2.2 Response Times
Examining response times first, there was a significant interaction between focality and block, b
= 1.48, t = 5.56, p < .001, reflecting greater slowing in the PM block relative to the control block
(i.e., task interference) for nonfocal compared to focal conditions (see Figure 1). As seen in
Figure 2, there was also a significant interaction between quarter and block, b = -.35, t = 2.65, p
= .008, indicating a reduction in task interference between quarters one and four. As an aside, for
the reader interested in spontaneous retrieval, a paired-samples t-test indicated that overall task
interference was marginally significant in the focal conditions (M slowing = 33 ms, SD = 138),
t(63) = 1.96, p = .06, Cohen’s d = .24.
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6.2.3 Difficulty and Motivation Ratings
Overall, participants reported being fairly motivated (M = 7.44, SD = 1.91) and did not find the
task to be overly difficult (M = 4.35, SD = 1.90). Next, we analyzed participants’ ratings of
difficulty with the same model used to analyze OT response times. In this model (see Table 5),
there was a marginally significant interaction between focality and block, b = .49, t = 1.83, p =
.07, suggesting a greater increase in PM-related difficulty for nonfocal relative to focal
conditions (see Figure 3). Next, the interaction between block and quarter was significant, with
quarters two, b = -.56, t = 2.49, p = .01, and three, b = -.40, t = 1.78, p = .08, both showing a
decline in PM-related difficulty relative to quarter one (Figure 4). When predicting motivation
ratings, the best model lacked any interactions with block; therefore, having no relationship with
task interference, reported motivation was not theoretically informative in this experiment.
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6.2.4 PM Accuracy
We used logistic regression to predict the likelihood of detecting the single PM target with
focality, onset delay, and their interaction as factors, as well as counterbalancing order. There
was a significant effect of onset delay, b = .71, z = 3.46, p < .001, with a greater likelihood of
detecting the target in the PM-near conditions (M = .78, SE = .05) than the PM-far conditions (M
= .48, SE = .06). The effect of focality was only marginal, b = .38, z = 1.85, p = .07, but in the
expected direction: there was a marginally greater probability of detecting the PM target in focal
conditions (M = .70, SE = .06) than in nonfocal conditions (M = .55, SE = .06). The interaction
was not significant (p = .92).

6.2.5 MANOVA
Finally, we computed difference scores between PM and control blocks for response times,
difficulty, and motivation, and used these three dependent variables – as well as PM accuracy –
in a 2 x 2 MANOVA with focality and onset delay as independent variables. There was a
significant effect for both focality, F(4, 119) = 8.65, Wilks’ lambda = .78, p < .001, and onset
delay, F(4, 119) = 4.33, Wilks’ lambda = .87, p = .003, but no interaction between the two (p =
.40). Dependent variable weights can be found in Table 7, and correlations between variables in
Table 8, but generally speaking the nonfocal conditions were separated from the focal conditions
primarily by an increase in task interference and PM-related ratings of difficulty, whereas the
PM-near conditions were separated from the PM-far conditions primarily by an increase in PM
accuracy and task interference, but a decline in PM-related difficulty. In the individual ANOVA
models, focality was significantly predictive of both task interference, F(1, 122) = 30.56, p <
.001, MSE = 2.30, ηp2 = .20, and PM-related difficulty, F(1, 122) = 3.95, p = .05, MSE = 2.32, ηp2
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= .03. Onset delay, by contrast, was significantly predictive of PM accuracy only, F(1, 122) =
13.53, p < .001, MSE = .21, ηp2 = .10.

46

6.3 Discussion
In accordance with the bulk of the prior literature, we predicted greater task interference for the
nonfocal conditions relative to the focal conditions, greater task interference in the PM-near
conditions than in the PM-far conditions, and an interaction between the two: the effect of onset
delay would be larger for the nonfocal conditions. Put another way, we expected PM effects on
response times to be reduced, if present, for the focal conditions. We also predicted that task
interference would begin at an elevated level (e.g., Q1), but that this difference would be
markedly reduced by the end of the block (e.g., Q4). Finally, we thought that the reduction in
task interference would interact with onset delay, such that a more pronounced decline would be
observed in the PM-far than the PM-near conditions.
However, the best model contained two-way interactions only; therefore, any three-way
interactive hypotheses such as, “nonfocal conditions should exhibit greater task interference in
the PM-near conditions than the PM-far conditions”, were clearly not supported. In addition, we
received no evidence for any effect of onset delay on task interference. What we did observe was
less task interference in focal relative to nonfocal conditions, and that overall task interference
was significantly reduced by the end of the block. If the PMDC model is seen as adaptive, in that
task interference is allowed to change within a block based on metacognitive expectations or task
characteristics (see Anderson et al., 2019 for details), then these findings align well with either
multiprocess or PMDC. Similarly, both theories can easily handle the PM accuracy findings: The
theories predict that declining task interference should result in lower PM performance when the
target is presented later in the experiment (see also, Scullin et al., 2010b). This is because
whatever behavior task interference reflects (e.g., monitoring or delay) is assumed to benefit PM
performance. Similarly, marginally greater PM performance in focal conditions is theoretically
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nondiagnostic—according to either theory, high focal PM performance does not require task
interference.
In regard to the null findings for onset delay, we suspect that controlling for overall target
number between conditions may have eliminated the presence of an effect. This is because we
based our prediction on a meta-analytically reliable effect, and meta-analyses do not control all
other variables to isolate effects (Anderson et al., 2019). For a fact, the absolute number of
targets is greater in experiments using an earlier onset delay. Or, reversed, if the experimenter
waits until well into the experiment to present the first target (long onset delay), then there is
pragmatically less time to present additional targets. Thus, experiments containing earlier onset
delays are more likely to reinforce those participants to monitor/delay after the first PM target by
presenting additional targets, thereby increasing task interference relative to later onset delays.
There was no opportunity for this to occur in our experiment: both onset delay conditions started
out with high task interference, then only the PM-near condition participants (at least, those who
were able to detect the target) got reinforced. However, all participants subsequently experienced
a long gap between targets, likely resulting in identical task interference patterns between
conditions.
More importantly, turning to the probe ratings, the multiprocess perspective predicts that
difficulty should parallel task interference. Given the task interference findings, therefore,
multiprocess theory predicts higher difficulty ratings in PM blocks relative to control blocks
(PM-related difficulty), that this should generally decline from Q1 to Q4, and greater PM-related
difficulty ratings for nonfocal relative to focal conditions. By contrast, the PMDC model would
likely predict that motivation ratings should parallel task interference, but certainly predicts no
relationship between difficulty ratings and task interference.
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We observed (marginally) greater PM-related difficulty ratings for nonfocal conditions,
as well as a decline in PM-related difficulty ratings across quarters (specifically, ratings were
reduced in Q2 and Q3 relative to Q1), clearly supporting a multiprocess view. There was a slight
bump in PM-related difficulty in Q4; speculatively, this could signify fatigue effects, but it also
may be due to some participants failing to detect any PM targets (especially in the PM-far
conditions) despite being well into the experiment. This could have caused some participants to
believe targets had been presented but missed, and subsequently judged the task to be more
difficult than previously imagined.10 Finally, there was no relationship between block and
motivation, implying no PM-related effects on motivation, thereby offering little support for
PMDC. These conclusions do not change when accounting for covariance between dependent
measures—the MANOVA attributed task interference and PM-related difficulty ratings as the
primary measures distinguishing between focal and nonfocal tasks, not motivation.

10

When conditionalized on whether or not participants detected the target, there were no significant effects, but
there was some indication that participants in the PM-far conditions, relative to PM-near conditions, had greater
PM-related difficulty in Q4 when they missed the PM target (M difference in task interference between the onset
delay conditions = 1.77) than when it was detected (M difference = 1.29).
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Chapter 7: Experiment 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to use an instructional manipulation of task interference to
once again see whether or not PM-related difficulty or motivation ratings would follow. Toward
that end, we assigned participants to either a PM-emphasis condition or an OT-emphasis
condition, providing instructions regarding the relative importance of either the OT or PM task.
Specifically, participants in the PM-emphasis condition were told to treat the PM task as their
primary task, whereas OT-emphasis participants were told the 2-back task was primary. We
again manipulated focality between subjects, for a total of four conditions. Based on prior work,
we anticipate that nonfocal conditions and PM-emphasis conditions will obtain greater task
interference (Smith & Bayen, 2004), with less interference in OT-emphasis conditions and focal
conditions (Harrison & Einstein, 2010; Kliegel et al., 2004). The focal conditions actually should
not result in any task interference (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005), though participants may choose to
monitor when given PM-emphasis instructions (despite it being unnecessary). The PM-emphasis
conditions should also have better PM performance than the OT-emphasis conditions. Once
again, multiprocess theory predicts that difficulty ratings will align with task interference,
whereas PMDC predicts that it should not, and perhaps instead motivation should.
To better detail these hypotheses, from the monitoring viewpoint, we anticipate that in
the nonfocal conditions, PM-emphasis instructions will increase difficulty ratings relative to the
OT-emphasis instructions. Based on findings from Kliegel et al. (2004), we anticipate that PM or
OT emphasis instructions will not have any effect in the focal conditions, with both groups likely
obtaining minimal task interference and no PM-related increase in difficulty. Though
theoretically uninformative from the multiprocess view, PM-emphasis instructions may or may
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not increase self-reported motivation: Motivation could increase if participants tend to prioritize
the PM task more heavily than the OT, but motivation may also increase equally between the
two conditions.
According to PMDC, emphasizing either the OT or PM task should make participants
more likely to set a conservative threshold to the ongoing task. However, because PM-emphasis
instructions typically increase task interference relative to prioritizing the OT, participants in the
PM-emphasis conditions should set even higher thresholds. Assuming task interference is greater
when the PM task is prioritized, motivation ratings should track these threshold differences.
However, because PMDC theory contends that the focal PM accumulation rate is as fast as the
OT accumulation rate, focal PM should be insensitive to motivation, assuming participants
choose not to expand their decision threshold. It could be argued, however, that properly
motivated participants with a focal PM task (e.g., in the focal PM-emphasis group) may obtain
both task interference and an increase in PM-related motivation. In the nonfocal conditions,
predictions are more straightforward: The highest motivation ratings should be present in the
nonfocal PM-emphasis condition, followed by the nonfocal OT-emphasis condition. Once again,
PMDC predicts no changes in difficulty ratings from the control to the PM block, nor any
differences in PM-related difficulty ratings among any of the four conditions.

7.1 Method
7.1.1 Participants and Design
In this experiment, we again used a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial design including the within-subjects
variable block (control, PM), and the between-subjects variables focality (focal, nonfocal), and
task emphasis (OT-emphasis, PM-emphasis). Power analyses were identical to Experiment 2,
51

and we assigned 32 participants to every condition other than the nonfocal OT emphasis
condition, which received 30 participants (total N = 126). Participants were Washington
University in St. Louis undergraduates who received course credit for compensation. As in the
first two experiments, no exclusion criteria were used.

7.1.2 Procedure
Procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 2; however, we changed the betweensubjects manipulation of onset delay to one of task emphasis. Participants in the PM-emphasis
conditions were told before the PM block, “When performing the 2-back task and the Q-key
task, we would like you to focus your efforts PRIMARILY on the Q-KEY TASK. This is your
most important goal.” Participants in the OT-emphasis conditions, by contrast, were told before
the PM block, “When performing the 2-back task and the Q-key task, we would like you to focus
your efforts PRIMARILY on the 2-BACK TASK. This is your most important goal.”
We also included more PM target events in this experiment than in Experiment 2. Out of
the 205 trials in the PM block, the 4 PM targets were presented on trials 38, 94, 143, and 198
(with a couple slight variations of one or two trials). The control block was 204 trials again, with
probes occurring on trials 50, 100, 150, and 200 for both blocks.

7.1.3 Materials
Stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 2, other than three non-match trials, which
were swapped for PM targets.

52

7.2 Results
7.2.1 Analysis Strategy
We used an identical analysis plan as was used in Experiment 2. That is, we analyzed clusters of
trials (level 1) nested within blocks (level 2) nested within participants (level 3), letting
intercepts vary. We also used the same trimming procedures and optimally transformed response
times using the Box-Cox power transformation (response times raised to the power = .46).11 OT
accuracy was again on ceiling in both blocks (control, M = .97, SD = .04; PM, M = .97, SD =
.03), preventing analysis.
We compared three nested models (main effects only and all two-way interactions, all
three-way interactions, and the four-way interaction) for each dependent variable using a
likelihood ratio test. Just as in Experiment 2, the best model for all dependent variables included
only two-way interactions between the four factors. Regarding PM performance, because there
were 4 PM targets, we used ordinary regression to determine whether or not there were group
differences. We first report these univariate analyses, and then use the same MANOVA design,
this time with focality and task emphasis as independent variables. Descriptive statistics and the
correlations among variables can be found in Tables 9 and 10, respectively, and the full results
from each model can be found in Tables 11 (response times), 12 (difficulty), and 13
(motivation). Again, we focus our report on theoretically informative findings (i.e., involving an
interaction with block).

11

Once again, transforming response times, instead of using raw scores, did not affect any inferential conclusions in
the following model.
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7.2.2 Response Times
Examining response times first, there was a significant interaction between focality and block, b
= 2.21, t = 5.82, p < .001, replicating the finding of greater task interference for nonfocal
compared to focal conditions (see Figure 5). Next, the interaction between quarter and block was
significant, b = -.56, t = 2.93, p = .004, once again replicating a reduction in task interference
between quarters one and four (Figure 6). As an aside, for the reader interested in spontaneous
retrieval, a paired-samples t-test indicated that overall task interference was not present in the
focal conditions (M slowing = 14 ms, SD = 164), t(63) = .92, p = .36, Cohen’s d = .12.
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7.2.3 Difficulty and Motivation Ratings
As in Experiment 2, participants reported being fairly motivated (M = 7.08, SD = 2.09) and did
not find the task to be overly difficult (M = 4.80, SD = 1.83). Next, we analyzed difficulty ratings
with the same two-way interactions model used to analyze response times. There was a
significant interaction between focality and block, b = .64, t = 2.45, p = .02, reflecting greater
PM-related difficulty in nonfocal compared to focal conditions (Figure 7). As seen in Figure 8,
there were three marginally significant interactions between quarter and block, suggesting that
PM-related difficulty declined in quarters two (b = -.39, t = 1.78, p = .08), three (b = -.39, t =
1.76, p = .08), and four (b = -.42, t = 1.88, p = .06) relative to quarter one.
For the same model predicting motivation ratings, there was a marginally significant
interaction, b = -.39, t = 1.97, p = .05, whereby focal conditions showed a small increase in PMrelated motivation, but nonfocal conditions actually showed a small decline in PM-related
motivation. Lastly, there was a marginal interaction between quarter and block, b = .28, t = 1.85,
p = .07, suggesting a PM-related increase in motivation ratings in quarter four relative to quarter
one.
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7.2.4 PM Accuracy
We used ordinary regression to predict the proportion of PM targets detected with focality, task
emphasis, and their interaction as factors, as well as counterbalancing order. There was a
significant effect of focality, b = .15, z = 5.73, p < .001, with a greater likelihood of detecting the
target in the focal conditions (M = .80, SE = .03) than the nonfocal conditions (M = .49, SE =
.04). There was also an effect of counterbalancing, b = -.11, z = 2.08, p = .04, such that PM
performance was better when the PM block came second (M = .70, SE = .04) than when it came
first (M = .58 SE = .04). Neither task emphasis, nor its interaction with focality, were significant
(both p’s > .64).

7.2.5 MANOVA
Finally, the MANOVA model used PM accuracy and difference scores between PM and control
blocks for response times, difficulty, and motivation, as dependent variables in a 2 x 2
MANOVA with focality and task emphasis as independent variables. There was a significant
effect for focality, F(4, 119) = 17.52, Wilks’ lambda = .63, p < .001, with no effect of task
emphasis or an emphasis by focality interaction (both p’s > .47). Dependent variable weights are
in Table 7, and correlations between variables in Table 14. We replicated the finding from
Experiment 2 that nonfocal conditions were separated from the focal conditions primarily by an
increase in task interference and greater PM-related difficulty. Likely due to increasing the
number of PM targets from Experiment 2, in this experiment lower PM accuracy was also
associated with having a nonfocal PM task. The PM-related motivation weighting did not
replicate, and actually flipped signs. In the individual ANOVA models, focality significantly
predicted task interference, F(1, 122) = 33.66, p < .001, MSE = 4.70, ηp2 = .21, PM-related
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difficulty, F(1, 122) = 6.08, p = .02, MSE = 2.16, ηp2 = .05, and PM accuracy, F(1, 122) = 32.54,
p < .001, MSE = .09, ηp2 = .21.

7.3 Discussion
In this experiment, we assigned participants to either a PM-emphasis condition or an OTemphasis condition, and they were given either a focal or nonfocal task during the PM block. We
expected to observe task interference in nonfocal, but not focal, conditions (Kliegel et al., 2004),
and for task interference to be greater when the PM task was emphasized (Smith & Bayen,
2004). However, if there was a small amount of interference for focal tasks, we expected it to be
limited to the PM-emphasis condition (Harrison & Einstein, 2010). To reiterate, multiprocess
theory predicts that difficulty ratings will align with task interference, whereas PMDC predicts
that they should not, thus requiring some other factor to explain differences in task interference
(e.g., motivation).
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Surprisingly, we found no significant interactions between task emphasis and block for
any of the dependent measures; that is, there were no PM-related changes in any dependent
variable due to task emphasis for this experiment. Without a standard PM control condition, it is
impossible to determine whether or not both emphasis conditions spent more time (i.e.,
monitoring or delay) on their respective tasks of import. Therefore, it could easily be the case
that both conditions increased task interference at an equivalent level; or, it could be the case that
neither condition responded to the manipulation as predicted. Yet, the latter interpretation is
favored, given that the amount of slowing between blocks was comparable (approximately 200
ms) for nonfocal conditions between Experiments 2 and 3, and Experiment 2 received no such
emphasis manipulation. In addition, we observed no PM accuracy benefit in the PM-emphasis
relative to OT-emphasis conditions, which is quite surprising. The reasons for why this may have
happened are not apparent, given the strength of the instructions, their similarity to prior research
(e.g., Harrison & Einstein, 2010; Kliegel et al., 2004; Smith & Bayen, 2004), and the fact that
participants were required to repeat the instructions to the experimenter. Another potential reason
is this: We know from Experiment 1 that probing participants increases their PM accuracy, so it
is also possible that participants in the OT-emphasis condition were able to perform better than
expected by being reminded periodically of the PM task. Regardless of the reasons, lacking any
effect of task emphasis simply removes one of our variables of influence on task interference.
Focusing on differences we did obtain, we largely replicated findings from Experiment 2:
Nonfocal conditions exhibited greater task interference and PM-related difficulty ratings than
focal conditions, and both dependent variables declined across quarters. We also replicated the
extremely consistent focal task benefit for PM performance (Kliegel et al., 2008). Although there
were PM-related changes in motivation ratings (an increase for focal but decrease for nonfocal,
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and a bump in quarter four relative to quarter one), neither effect follows a predicted pattern
according to either theory. For one, there is no reason to expect an increase in experienced
motivation in either focal conditions or toward the end of the block (Q4), given that task
interference declines in both of those scenarios. Second, there is also no reason to expect a
decline in PM-related motivation ratings for nonfocal conditions, given the high levels of task
interference observed for nonfocal tasks. The latter is especially problematic for PMDC, given
that participants with a nonfocal task would need to be at least as motivated as those with a focal
task, or they should not have increased their thresholds. On the other hand, multiprocess theory
could account for these results by claiming that extended periods of monitoring may be draining
and discouraging, thereby hurting participants’ motivation (though this would not necessarily be
predicted). Collectively, these results once again support a multiprocess perspective, and the
MANOVA findings offer additional support by consistently implicating higher task interference
and PM-related difficulty, but not motivation, as separating nonfocal from focal conditions.
Interestingly, the weighting of PM-related motivation was increased relative to Experiment 1, but
this is likely due to the somewhat odd interaction between focality and block in the hierarchical
model (described above).
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Chapter 8: General Discussion
The motivating question behind this research was simple: When we observe task interference
due to some PM-related behavior, monitoring or delay, what cognitive experiences are associated
with this increase in response time? As detailed at length throughout, under the multiprocess
view, the assumption is that task interference reflects cognitively demanding cue-monitoring
processes; thus, the most likely candidate is an increase in subjective task difficulty. According
to PMDC, by contrast, task interference reflects a strategic decision to follow a more
conservative OT decision policy – trading speed for accuracy – thereby allowing more time for
PM information to accrue. Therefore, we offered motivation as a potential candidate explaining
why participants may choose to increase or decrease their proactive delay policies. Regardless,
according to PMDC, difficulty ratings should be unrelated to task interference.
To address this question, we first developed and validated a probe procedure asking
participants to self-report their on-line experiences of difficulty and motivation (separately)
toward the ongoing and PM tasks (jointly). In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that self-reported
difficulty increased when the OT was made objectively more difficult (2-back compared to 1back), as well as when the PM task was made more difficult (three-cue compared to one-cue).
We also demonstrated that self-reported motivation increased when there was a strong motivator
present (i.e., money). Thus, the probe procedure responded as expected, with subjective ratings
reliably tracking objective changes in both difficulty and motivation.
Next, confident in the sensitivity of our measures, we conducted two experiments
designed to manipulate task interference in conceptually different ways. In Experiment 2, we
tried to induce changes in task interference longitudinally by changing the amount of time (i.e.,
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number of trials) preceding the first PM target, also known as the PM onset delay. In Experiment
3, instead, we varied whether or not the OT or PM task was primary (i.e., task emphasis), in the
hopes of pushing task interference around with a more preemptive, global task approach. In both
experiments we also manipulated focality, which nearly always results in greater task
interference and worse PM accuracy for nonfocal PM tasks, relative to focal tasks (Anderson et
al., 2019).

8.1 A Consistent Story
Beginning with Experiment 2, we initially predicted that the PM-near conditions should result in
greater task interference, because detecting the target earlier in the experiment should reinforce
behaviors associated with PM detection, causing a slower decline in monitoring/delay behavior
as each quarter of the experiment progressed. Instead, we did not obtain any PM-related
differences between onset delay conditions for any dependent variable—other than PM accuracy,
for which the PM-near conditions had a greater likelihood to detect the single PM target than the
PM-far conditions. Though it was somewhat surprising we did not obtain any effects of onset
delay on task interference, in hindsight the reason why seems clear: if the first target is presented
later in the experiment (i.e., PM-far), then there is less time for the experimenter to place
additional targets, thus reducing the overall potential for monitoring/delay behavior to be
reinforced. This was especially true here, because both conditions received only one PM target.
Thus, it is likely that both groups’ task interference declined at statistically identical rates
because we did not include additional targets in the PM-near conditions.
Though onset delay did not influence task interference as expected, focality did, with far
greater slowing in nonfocal conditions than focal conditions. Thus, this study was still able to
address the critical question: Given that task interference was greater in nonfocal conditions, did
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these participants also have a larger PM-related increase in rated difficulty than those with a
focal task? Additionally, given that task interference tended to decline across quarters, did PMrelated difficulty ratings also decline? The answer to both questions was unambiguously yes,
offering strong support for the multiprocess view that task interference indicates monitoring.
Motivation ratings did not add any additional wrinkles to the story, either. Even the MANOVA
models, after accounting for the covariance between motivation ratings and the other dependent
measures, consistently associated greater task interference and difficulty ratings, but not
motivation ratings, with nonfocal conditions. It is also worth noting that motivation ratings,
despite being high in both experiments, were normally distributed and not on ceiling, so a purely
statistical explanation likely cannot account for the null findings.
Turning to Experiment 3, the story was identical: PM task emphasis instructions, relative
to OT emphasis, did not result in greater slowing as we expected, but focality once again had a
powerful influence, replicating results from Experiment 2. Though it is unclear whether both
conditions slowed responding to an equivalent extent, or whether neither condition responded to
the task emphasis manipulation, the most important finding was that self-reported difficulty once
again tracked task interference and motivation ratings did not. Specifically, PM-related difficulty
ratings increased in nonfocal conditions relative to focal, and declined across quarters of the
experiment, just as in Experiment 2.

8.2 Theoretical Implications
Since the early 2000s (e.g., Smith, 2003), slowed OT responding has been observed when
participants must simultaneously perform an embedded PM task, and numerous studies
following have consistently implicated attentionally-demanding cue-monitoring processes in
what has been termed task interference (or cost). Yet, despite findings that tangentially implicate
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difficulty, such as in neuroimaging studies (e.g., sustained activation is usually observed in areas
of the fronto-parietal network for nonfocal tasks; McDaniel et al., 2013) or studies examining
relations to working memory (e.g., working memory capacity is important for nonfocal PM;
Brewer et al., 2010), to our knowledge no study has yet to take the (deceptively) simple approach
to directly ask participants how difficult they find the task to be.
With recent theoretical advancements that instead implicate a proactive delay as the
process underlying task interference (Heathcote et al., 2015; Strickland et al., 2017, 2018), this
question has become more relevant than ever; PMDC rightfully forces the field to stop, backtrack, and make sure that we are operating under correct assumptions. To help adjudicate this
debate, we examined not only task interference, but also variables that should theoretically be
associated with task interference. Although PMDC theory does not explicitly connect what sorts
of behavioral changes might be associated with changes in task interference, their proposed
mechanism for task interference, a strategic delay, does place some limits on the possibilities.
For example, because participants set their decision threshold before onset of the stimulus, and
some degree of stability is obtained within the first few trials (Ratcliff et al., 2016), participants
must base their delay policy on task characteristics, such as focality (see Strickland et al., 2017).
Further, because the drift-rate parameter, and not the threshold parameter, is thought to track
difficulty (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998), and PMDC theorists contend that the drift-rate does not
(and should not) decrease when nonfocal PM demands are present, there is no reason to think
that difficulty ratings should be related to task interference.
Thus, we offered motivation as a factor that could potentially explain changes in task
interference, with the following reasoning: people who are particularly motivated to perform
well on the PM task should do whatever they can (within reason) to ensure target detection, and
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the more motivated they are, the greater lengths they should be willing to go to. Therefore, these
highly motivated individuals should follow a very conservative speed/accuracy policy (resulting
in high task interference); in contrast, the less motivated participants should not change the base
delay policy they adhere to when performing the OT only. If PMDC still has merit, then our
intuitions in this regard were obviously off, given that motivation ratings were completely
unrelated to PM, in either Experiment 2 or 3, in any sensible way. Also mentioned in previous
work (Anderson & McDaniel, 2019; Anderson et al. 2018, 2019), forthcoming advancements
from PMDC theorists should work to address this knowledge gap, and inform the field what
factors influence people’s decisions to change their thresholds.
Furthermore, PMDC theory must now accommodate the findings presented here, which
suggest that difficulty is reliably related to task interference. That is, future theoretical work from
PMDC theorists must in some way account for the PM-related changes in difficulty ratings we
observed, such as a greater increase in experienced difficulty for nonfocal PM tasks. However,
even the simple increase in difficulty ratings from control block to PM block is problematic for
PMDC, given the theoretical framework that has been proposed (Strickland et al., 2018). No
obvious reconciliation presents itself immediately, and Experiment 1 severely limits worries over
the validity of the difficulty measure itself. Further, the fact that our findings replicate between
Experiments 2 and 3 should ease concerns as to their reliability. Therefore, PMDC faces a
difficult theoretical challenge ahead.
PMDC could potentially accommodate these findings by contending that participants’
perceptions of difficulty are influenced by their perceptions of task complexity; Strickland et al.
(2018) did state that task interference in nonfocal tasks could be due either to deliberately trying
to increase PM detection, or it could be due to increased “perceptions of task complexity” (p.
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874). If perceived task complexity causes changes in perceived difficulty, without a
corresponding change in objective difficulty, then PMDC could reconcile some of our findings.
However, in that case it would still be uncertain why perceptions of task complexity would
decline across quarters of the experiment, as we have shown PM-related difficulty and task
interference to decline. Further, if this line of reasoning has merit, then the increase in thresholds
should produce a corresponding increase in OT accuracy. Though OT accuracy was on ceiling in
this experiment, a meta-analysis of task interference recently found that accuracy does not
increase—and instead declines—as task interference increases (Anderson et al., 2019). Thus,
there is good evidence that objective task difficulty does increase along with task interference,
and the findings presented here provide evidence that participants can reliably report their
subjective experiences of this difficulty increase.
Multiprocess theory, on the other hand, has little trouble handling this study’s findings. In
fact, the multiprocess view straightforwardly predicted nearly every result across all three
experiments. The best support comes from the finding that focal tasks obtained a smaller bump
in difficulty, from control to PM block, than nonfocal tasks. This is because the explanation for
why focal tasks typically result in lower task interference and higher PM performance has always
been that focal tasks have reduced attentional demands, obviating the need for monitoring
(though some people may still choose to). Thus, when participants are not monitoring – no task
interference is present – there should be no increase in perceived difficulty. Although difficulty
ratings for participants in the focal conditions did significantly increase, the effect was reduced
relative to nonfocal conditions in both Experiment 2 and 3. Still, to verify whether or not focal
participants who unnecessarily decided to monitor were responsible for this increase in
difficulty, we conducted exploratory analyses conditionalized on whether or not people were
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considered to be monitoring. If a participant’s task interference was less than or equal to zero,
they were not considered to be monitoring, but if the value was greater than zero they were
considered to be monitoring (irrespective to focality). Two paired-samples t-tests found no
significant increase in difficulty ratings in either experiment for participants who were not
monitoring (Experiment 1: t(34) = -1.22, p = .23, Cohen’s d = .21; Experiment 2: t(31) = -1.64, p
= .11, Cohen’s d = .29). Thus, for participants who showed no task interference, the vast
majority of whom had a focal PM task, there was no corresponding increase in difficulty, further
supporting a multiprocess perspective.
Incorporating these results with the bulk of the literature, the field now has more direct
evidence for what was reasonably assumed in the past: Task interference is associated with
perceived increases in difficulty; therefore, when participants report that they use a targetsearching strategy (e.g., as they did in Anderson et al., 2018), we can be confident that this
behavior falls under the large umbrella of ‘cognitively demanding processes’. Now, converging
evidence from numerous sources makes it unlikely that self-reported monitoring—for example,
participants often report rehearsing the intention or searching for features relevant to the PM
target—is epiphenomenal. All indicators assessed so far, self-reported or objectively observed,
point toward monitoring (and not delay) as the theoretical construct responsible for task
interference.
One concern that future researchers should be aware of, however, is that the difficulty
probe procedure was not intended for use beyond addressing a particular theoretical contention;
we should acknowledge that the effect sizes observed using this measure were small, and the
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reliability was likely quite poor, with only four probes per block.12 Therefore, future work
interested in difficulty perceptions should ideally increase the number of probes considerably.
However, adding more probes to the experiment would likely be disruptive to the participant,
and could compromise the validity of the PM experiment itself. Thus, a truly ideal scenario
would be to maintain a similar ratio of probes to trials, and have participants return for multiple
sessions (see Strickland et al., 2018 for use of this multi-session methodology). In this way, the
integrity of the experiment could be maintained while simultaneously increasing the reliability of
the difficulty probes. Further, the validity of the measure could be improved by looking for
correlations with more objective physiological measures of difficulty, such as pupil dilation,
galvanic skin response, and heart rate. Pupil dilation, in particular, would be interesting, as it is
often used as a direct measure of attentional control.
Based on the findings of this study, as well as previous research using a variety of
methods to explicitly evaluate the relative strengths of multiprocess and PMDC theories
(Anderson & McDaniel, 2019; Anderson et al. 2018, 2019), we encourage PM researchers to
favor a multiprocess perspective, pending future work from both theoretical camps. As it stands
currently, the bulk of the research supporting PMDC relies on model comparison as a purported
litmus test—and they invariably show that the PMDC model fits the data best and fits the data
well. Yet, such endeavors require that the models are all appropriately specified, that all relevant
models are included, and that the model parameters are psychologically validated as reflecting
particular behaviors. Undeniably, the architects of the PMDC model have gone to great lengths
satisfying the statistical requirements and creating an impressive model that fits the data well.

12

To get at the reliability issue, we calculated the average correlation between difficulty probes in the control block
(because the control block is likely less contaminated by experimental demands). This correlation was r = .63 after
transforming from an average Fisher’s z score.
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However, we also know that the accumulator model parameters have not been uniquely
linked to PM-related behaviors, instead displaying considerable covariance (Anderson et al.,
2018). Specifically, Anderson et al. observed changes in drift-rates, nondecision time, and
thresholds when a PM task was added to the OT, and this was true even in conditions designed to
isolate delay or monitoring behaviors. Thus, strong inferences about PM based on these model
parameters should be avoided, pending more conclusive validation. Yet, even assuming that the
other considerations have been reasonably met, the theoretical architecture of the model is
contradicted by the bulk of the literature, including this study, and thus cannot be considered
valid. The use of accumulator models in PM is an exciting new methodological foray, but if the
inferential conclusions such models point toward are simply not sensible, then serious
consideration should be given to either abandoning or overhauling that model. At the very least,
given the available evidence, PMDC theory should be taken with a grain of salt, and certainly not
preferred over a multiprocess view.
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Appendix
Counterbalancing Effects on Response Times in Experiment 1
Motivation counterbalancing order significantly interacted with motivation, F(1,114) = 11.41, p
= .001, MSE = 1.43, ηp2 = .09, such that the motivation effect (longer response times when
motivated) was reduced when the motivated block came second. Additionally, N-back
counterbalancing order significantly interacted with OT load, F(1,114) = 100.70, p < .001, MSE
= 2.16, ηp2 = .47. Presumably due to practice effects, response times when the 1-back task came
first were statistically equivalent to those obtained for the 2-back task. However, when the 2back task came first, response times were slower for the 2-back relative to the 1-back task. These
two factors further interacted with cue number, F(1,114) = 8.33, p = .005, MSE = 2.16, ηp2 = .07,
revealing that the difference in response times between the 1-back and 2-back task, only when
the 2-back task came first, was greater when participants were given three cues than when they
were given one. Motivation counterbalancing, OT load, and motivation also significantly
interacted, F(1,114) = 7.12, p = .009, MSE = .59, ηp2 = .06. The interaction was reflected in a
larger response time difference between the 1-back and 2-back task (2-back being slower) in
motivated blocks when motivation came first, and a larger difference between the 1-back and 2back task in non-motivated blocks when motivation came second. Finally, there was a four-way
interaction between motivation counterbalancing, N-back counterbalancing, OT load, and
motivation, F(1,114) = 17.48, p < .001, MSE = .59, ηp2 = .13, which is difficult to interpret, but
seems to be some combination of the aforementioned effects.
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